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Abstract 
Active labour market policies (ALMPs) and Public Employment Services are related 
components of European Union and member state labour market policy. Typically, PES are 
analysed in terms of a narrow concern with efficiency and effectiveness of service. In this paper 
we argue that PES are constituents in broader processes. They are not just means to facilitate 
employment, they are also part of transmission mechanisms for a political economy of 
competitiveness. They play a particular role in governance processes, and so serve to produce 
and reproduce power relations that are intrinsic to those processes. We argue that the technical 
ways that PES have been managed over recent decades has contributed to broader processes of 
disempowering labour, through depoliticised management practices.  We argue that attempts at 
even limited re-empowerment of labour would require a repoliticisation of these management 
practices. 
 
Introduction: Positioning the role of public employment services (PES) within  the 
discourse of EU labour market reform 
There has been widespread interest in the policy evaluation literature in the relative 
effectiveness of different types of Active Labour Market Policy.  By contrast, the political 
economy literature has been critical of Active Labour Market Policies for focussing on 
‘workfarism’ and the discipline that this places on the working population; seeing these policies 
as part of a broader process of neo-liberalisation. A smaller and more recent literature has 
focussed not just on institutional and policy design but on the detailed management practices 
by which policy is implemented.  Much of this is technical, but some of it draws attention to 
the ways in which implementation practices might also carry political economy content. This 
paper offers a contribution to these latter two literatures.  We argue that the ways in which 
Public Employment Services implement aspects of ALMP have consequences for the types of 
reform delivered.   
 
We argue specifically that performance management has been used to transfer neo-liberalising 
policy content between scales – from the scale of macro-regional meta-governance through to 
the ways in which PES advisers shape the relationship between households and firms at the 
scale of fronline service delivery.  Performance management in policy implementation is 
characteristic of the depoliticisation of this disempowerment, where it is turned into a technical 
and managerial process.  This depoliticisation adds to a ‘locking-in’ of disempowerment into 
the ways that policy is implemented, even when high level policy objectives are ostensibly 
shifted in favour of limited empowerment.  To be able to implement such a shift would require 
the repoliticisation of management technologies such as performance management.  The first 
section lays out this argument and the engagement with the literature in more detail.  The 
discussion then moves on to the underpinning data and an empirical account of the ways that 
Performance Management is used in European PES.  The final section concludes by relating 
the empirical discussion to the conceptual themes drawn from the literature in the first section. 
 
Framing the Competitiveness Problem and Public Employment Services as 
Delivering the ‘Activation’ Solution 
It is widely acknowledged that the adoption of ‘activation’ or ‘workfarism’ as a labour market 
policy goal has been associated with the process of neoliberalisation (Peck, 2002; Peck & 
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Theodore, 2001; Theodore & Peck, 2001).  Here we use these terms as expressed by Peck, 
Brenner et al. (Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2010a, 2010b; Peck, 2010; Peck, Theodore, & 
Brenner, 2012; Peck & Tickell, 2007). That is; to refer to reform processes that respond to 
common pressures to improve place-based competitiveness, but which are implemented in 
localised, contingent and path-dependent ways.  So while there are common trends in policy, 
aspects of institutional design remain varied and, occasionally, divergent.   
 
Actual policy implementation must take international policy templates but adapt them to local 
conditions, often, in the process, coping with aspects of failure in policy implementation. In 
political economy terms activation through ‘Active Labour Market Policies’ (ALMPs) has been 
associated with ‘risk dumping’ (Peck, 2002), where localities and households are expected to 
bear the responsibility for economic competitiveness. In this sense, ALMPs are intended to 
‘empower’ individuals to cope with downwardly distributed risks, whilst also reducing the 
option of livlihoods outside of the formal labour market; most notably by taking advantage of 
the sheltering effects of the welfare state. Concomitantly, ALMPs have also ‘disempowered’ 
labour, reducing choices about alternative forms of subsistence and, in some contexts, also the 
type of work in the formal labour market that is judged acceptable. Thus ALMPs can be 
regarded as ‘disempowered empowerment’.  However, the effects have not been even, since 
processes are path-dependent, contested and contingent. Different national compromises have 
sought different balances between disempowerment and empowerment. To pick stylised 
examples, Germany and Denmark have been more associated with upskilling for innovation 
competitiveness, whilst the UK has tended to be more associated with expanding the supply of 
labour for cost competitiveness. However, while some EU member states have disempowered 
labour relative to capital to a greater extent, all member states have undertaken labour market 
reform and the ultimate context has remained a relative downgrading of the power of labour in 
relation to capital (see Bassanini & Manfredi, 2012; Bruff, 2010; Kumhof & Ranciere, 2010). 
 
Any number of starting points could be identified for the development of EU concerns with the 
implementation of ALMPs in pursuit of competitiveness The Delors’ Competitiveness White 
Paper of 1993 is an early initiative illustrative of a policy shift (European Commission, 1993) 
from welfare to competition state principles (Cerny, 1997, 2010). The White Paper recognized 
that many member states shared problems of structural unemployment and a technology gap. 
This was placed in the context of a lack of competitiveness, one claimed root problem of which 
was the role of labour. Recommended measures included increased labour market flexibility, 
reduction of labour costs through reductions in social protection taxes, youth job creation 
schemes, the reform of social protection to incentivise work, and the development of ‘pro-
active’ labour market services to activate and match jobseekers to the requirements of 
employers.  The White Paper also argued for containing wage gains below the rate of 
productivity growth and up-skilling the existing and potential workforce (1993: 117-133).  
 
The White Paper could be read solely in terms of the specific context of the early 1990s. Many 
EU member states had experienced, and were still experiencing, the decline of manufacturing, 
which had created ripple effects: problems of the breakdown of the economic component in 
traditional family structures focused on a male breadwinner and female domestic (unpaid) 
labour, the dissolution of longstanding employment pathways open to youth within local 
communities, and so forth. Emerging policy thus had a recognizable purpose: facilitating 
broader access to, and participation in, labour markets and the promotion of economic 
restructuring, including a transition to more service-based economies.  However, the ‘framing’ 
(Elias, 2013) of social problems as the result of a lack of competitiveness and justification for 
renewed neoliberalisation through activation policies, has been a sustained theme through 
different strategies, including the 1997 European Employment Strategy and the ill-feted Lisbon 
Strategy of 2000, which singularly failed to encourage productivity growth and guide the 
transformation of the EU into the premier ‘knowledge-based economy’ in the world by 2010 
(European Council, 2000, 2009; Jessop, 2006; Kok, 2004). Based on this recognized failure, 
the subsequent Europe 2020 initiative of 2010 stated the same problems in relation to the same 
set of (positioned) solutions one finds in the 1993 White Paper (European Commission, 2010b). 
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That is, insufficient productivity growth, high dependency ratios (non-working populations), 
and problems of labour supply, all of which call forth the need for further labour market reform 
and support of the kinds already stated (European Commission, 2010b: p. 8; however, see 
Boyer, 2015 for complementarities). 
 
As Peck and collaborators argue, the sustained framing of social and economic problems as a 
lack of competitiveness and the frequent failure of these strategies to lead to relative 
improvement reflect a ‘fail forward’ (Peck et al. 2012) approach. Here, the repeated failure to 
achieve stated competitiveness outcomes provides the justification for renewed efforts to 
prusue similar reform, albeit through iteratively developed governance mechanisms.  So reform 
implementation in Europe 2020 is now through the ‘European Semester’ rather than the Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines of the early 2000s.  China and India take the place of the US and 
Japan as the contemporary competitive threat. Repeated failure to become, for example, ‘the 
worlds most knowledge based economy’ have resulted in greater exhortations for reform and 
more attention to how support from reformers at sub-state scales can be secured (Nunn and 
Beeckmans, 2015). 
 
While neoliberalisation (Boas & Gans-Morse, 2009), the role of activation (e.g.Peck, 2002) and 
the effectiveness of ALMPs in achieving their objectives (Card, Kluve, & Weber, 2010; Kluve, 
2007; Kluve, 2010; Kluve, Lehmann, & Schmidt, 2008; Filges et al., 2015), have attracted 
agreat deal of scholarly attention, there has been less focus on the political economy content of 
particular ways of implementing activation (Bredgaard and Larsen, 2007).  ALMPs are one 
component within labour market policy and Public Employment Services (PES) are one 
component of ALMPs; designed to improve information flow and job matching and therefore 
productivity, as well as increasing the discipline placed upon unemployed job seekers.  PES 
provide the ‘services and sanctions’ component of ALMPs which are, in ALMP meta-
evaluation literature, often regarded as the most effective means to reduce unemployment and 
achieve fiscal balance (Kluve, 2010). We emphasise that both ALMPs and PES are constituents 
in broader processes. PES are not just means to facilitate employment, they are also part of 
transmission mechanisms for a particular form of political economy.  They play a particular 
role in governance processes, and so serve to produce and reproduce power relations that are 
intrinsic to those processes. They serve to embed a political economy into social relations 
within and between households and between households and firms through sub-state scale 
activity (Nunn, 2016). 
 
That activation has been a vehicle for neoliberalisation is familiar territory. However, most 
analyses of activation focus at the policy scale, and most analyses of the role of public 
management techniques in PES as implementors of activation focus on technical aspects of 
management practice, as opposed to its political economy content. This paper provides 
empirical support for the familiar point that the implementation of activation through public 
management practices has contributed to neoliberalisation. It also provides an original 
demonstration that even where institutional differences have persisted between states pursuing 
different path-dependent strategies for competitiveness based on different skill orientations and 
emphases, the ways in which these have been implemented via management techniques have 
been remarkably similar. The paper also illustrates the ways PES management practices 
contribute to a ‘locking in’ process that extends far beyond quasi-constitutional commitments 
(for e.g. Gill, 1998). Lock-in is embedded in everyday practices, which are depoliticised 
(Burnham, 2001) in as much as they present what are highly political processes of 
‘disempowered empowerment’ as politically neutral management techniques to achieve a self-
evident and widely shared social good.  Where this depoliticisation of management practices 
has been successful, it can even present a barrier to the realisation of elite interests.  In this case, 
‘fail forward’ shifts in emphasis suggest a need to move toward innovation competitiveness 
and upskilling, but depoliticised technical practices such as performance management have 
locked in particular professional orientations to the delivery of labour market policy that are 
difficult to reorient.  
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To understand the latter point it is worth noting that the emphasis in Peck and collaborators’ 
work on the contingent and contested nature of neoliberalisation (Peck, 2013; Brenner et al, 
2010) draws attention not just to the fail-forward nature of policy, but also the ways in which 
policies and their implementation lead to myriad different consequences, some of which are 
unintended or unanticipated. The clear dominance of finance, ‘speed up’ and for returns to 
capital in preference to labour has led to increasing inequality and economic problems 
associated with this, including slower growth (Piketty, 2014; Fullbrook and Morgan, 2014; 
Morgan, 2015). The resulting ‘new politics of inequality’ (see Nunn, 2015; 2016) is marked by 
elite interests to contain rising inequality for fear of the socially destabilising effects it might 
have, and because it might impede growth (IMF, 2014; OECD, 2015). To reframe the problem 
in institutionalist language – the role of capital in shaping rule making has undermined 
‘beneficial constraints’ on its own operation (Streeck, 2004). Disempowered empowerment and 
the resulting loss of political influence of labour may actually be a long-term drag on aggregate 
growth and competitiveness. This may result if the combination undermines productivity and 
inhibits effective employment via matching. 
 
Within this context, in Europe 2020 and the various sectoral strategies and action plans that 
emerged from it (see Nunn and Beeckmans, 2015) such as the Agenda for Skills and Jobs 
(European Commission, 2010a) and PES 2020 (European Comission, 2012; see also OECD, 
2011) the EU began to reframe the EU’s competitiveness challenge in ways that implied that 
labour needed to be empowered more effectively (if still in highly limited and contingent ways). 
Of these further specificiations, the former stresses the need to enhance ALMPs, improve job 
search, and in combination with the latter recommends that PES adopt the role of ‘transitional 
agencies’ designed to facilitate not just unemployment-to-job transitions but also job-to-job 
transitions and alternative longer-term routes into work, such as vocational training. 
Significantly, the role of PES is reconceived as a networked system bringing together training 
providers, employers and public bodies, with greater emphasis on career guidance, coaching 
and skills. The stated goal is now ‘sustainable’ activation (tacitly acknowledging that a great 
deal of past policy had been simply about increasing participation based on ‘any job would do’ 
- a context ripe for least cost exploitations). Ostensibly, the new emphasis seems to imply the 
potential to rebalance the empowerment and disempowerment inherent in labour market policy 
over the last two decades.  We argue that depoliticised public management practices in the 
implementation of activation through PES have been an important barrier to this, principally 
because these techniques are not neutral but have been applied in a way that embeds a political 
economy content.  The sections which follow document this empirically, drawing on a synthesis 
of several studies.  The conclusion suggests that even limited (re)empowerment would require 
infusing management techniques with re-politicised characteristics. 
 
PES and the political economy of performance management  
Rationale and data 
There has been a relative lack of research into the different ways in which the governance and 
implementation of activation influence the resolution of potentially contradictory pressures 
associated with competitiveness via domestic institutions and policy implementation.  This 
paper adds to a small number of studies that explicitly focus on how labour market governance 
is conducted (e.g. Borghi & Van Berkel, 2007; Van Berkel & Borghi, 2008; Van Berkel, 2010; 
Van Berkel & Van der Aa, 2012; Weishaupt, 2010, 2011).  More specifically, the paper focuses 
on the way that internal PES management practices influence ALMP delivery.  A lack of 
evidence about these specific internal practices is slowly being addressed by the emergence of 
a number of recent studies on PES Performance Management (PM) (Ecorys, 2012; Grubb, 
2004; Kaltenborn, Wielage, von Bothmer, & Henkel, 2011; Mosley, Schutz, & Breyer, 2000, 
2001; Nunn, 2012a, 2013; Nunn, Bickerstaffe, & Mitchell, 2010). However, these studies focus 
largely on performance management (PM) as technical policy implementation and management 
practice - rather than on the political, economic and social significance of these practices. This 
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paper addresses this specific gap, based on an original meta-synthesis of the findings from three 
recent studies of PM practice across European PES, in places augmented by insights from a 
further set of six larger scale and in-depth studies conducted in relation to the UK PES.  
 
The first of the three studies (Nunn et al., 2010) was funded by the UK labour ministry, and 
intended to provide an international review of practice to inform the development of a new PM 
framework for the UK PES. This involved a review of secondary evidence in the published and 
available ‘grey’ literature, a European-wide survey of PES practitioners and unstructured 
telephone interviews with practitioners in a small number of case study countries (Denmark, 
Austria, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland).  The second and third studies were funded by the 
European Commission (EC) through the PES-to-PES Dialogue process, which is part of the 
discursive meta-governance associated with the European Employment Strategy.  The second 
(Nunn, 2012a) involved an updating of the 2010 study (principally, but not only, drawing on 
the fieldwork conducted by Ecorys (2012) and a further series of interviews in PES selected by 
the Commission (the UK, Austria, Germany and the Czech Republic).  The focus of this study 
was to identify areas of good practice and learning that PES practitioners could take from the 
international evidence. The third study (Nunn, 2013) arose from a ‘Peer Review’ of PM as part 
of the PES-to-PES dialogue.  This involved the collection and collation of detailed reports1 on 
the design and use of PM provided by each of the 15 (voluntarily) participating PES. This was 
followed by a two-day workshop, hosted by the Danish PES and involving representatives from 
all 15 PES, and presentations from Denmark, Austria, Germany, Switzerland and Belgium 
(Flanders: VDAB) as well as thematic consideration of sub-national benchmarking; the balance 
between local and national target setting and control; and the use of PM data as a means to 
‘build the business case’ for PES in the context of public spending reductions across all PES 
present.  Again the focus here was to draw together a comparison of different practices, 
identifying where practitioners could learn from experience elsewhere in Europe.   
 
What we want to emphasise is that the processes and concerns are not neutral in political 
economy terms. Performance management is an inter-linking practice (Nunn, 2010) which knits 
other aspects of the NPM together.  For example, outcome targets and measures can act as ‘rule 
regimes’ which shape and constrain practice in privatised, decentralised and arms-length 
producers of public services.  Even within the state, this is an inter-scalar practice.  Political 
authority at one scale can operate at others indirectly in a ‘steering but not rowing’ capacity via 
setting outcome or output targets and indicators to guide governance practice, but as we have 
seen above, this also extends to the supra-national scale and involves trans-scalar linkages too.  
This has consequences for the nature of the services provided and the relationships that are 
brokered between state institutions, households and firms. Once systems and practices exist, 
they shape how new initiatives are received and change is mediated. In the following sections 
we emphasise 4 points: 
 
1. What is measured through performance management and how it is measured matters 
for the nature of PES. 
2. The ‘what’ and ‘how’ of measurement occur within the context of PES staff practice: 
the influence of targets, the emphasis or selection amongst targets and the prior 
socialisation of staff, which mediates change. 
3. Intended change to PES can be undermined because of the interconnections between 1 
& 2. 
4. 1-3 has a political economy dynamic and also a political economy context. PES and 
PES PM are transmission mechanisms within governance processes.   
                                                     
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=105&newsId=1827&furtherNews=yes  
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The spread of Performance Management Practice 
Over the last two decades there has been increasing use of performance management in 
European PES (Mosley et al., 2001) to the point where this is now virtually omnipresent (Nunn, 
2012a).  This has been encouraged by international bodies such as the OECD (Grubb, 2004; 
Martin & Grubb, 2001, 2001; Tergeist & Grubb, 2006) and particularly the European 
Commission and the peer-pressure occasioned through the OMC which operates within the 
boundaries of the European Employment Strategy (EES) and the related but broader processes 
of technical dialogue and discursive governance associated with it. Indeed, most of the research 
underpinning this paper arises from wider coordinating processes associated with the OMC, 
and is therefore the product of that discursive governance process. Performance management 
has been the regular subject of peer reviews, technical analytical papers and thematic 
discussions in the processes of mutual learning between EU PES (at the sub-state scale) which 
is mandated as part of the Treaty of the European Union.  It is hard to conclude that the now 
near universal uptake of this management practice is directly resultant from this, but equally, it 
would be difficult to conclude that it has no influence. ‘Strategic Performance Management’ is 
now part of the ‘Benchlearning’ process which sees EU PES visited regularly by a group of 
assessors who score them against a set of criteria and make reccomendations where they fall 
short of the assumed best practice. PES then need to prepare a ‘change report’ to show how 
they are respondeing to these reccomendations and which is scrutinised by their peers in the 
EU PES Network.  This is a good illustration of the ways in which intra and trans-scalar 
pressures to adopt particular types of management practice are themselves driven by forms of 
multi-scalar performance management and that the domestic embedding of performance 
management practice below the state-scale is itself a functional part of that process. 
 
Increasing sophistication in practice and infrastructure 
In addition to the increasing use of PES PM, many PES are developing complex management 
and information technologies which promote the use, and further development, of PM.  These 
include the much vaunted ‘Datawarehouses’ which, starting in Austria in the early 2000s 
(Lissenburgh, 2004), have come to be widely used by PES. ‘Datawarehouse’ is a popular term 
for systems that allow the linking of administrative and benefit/tax records such that PES can 
(potentially) better track individual citizens and in some cases allow frontline data collection 
(of activities and jobseeker behaviour) to combine with this.  A Peer Review found that of a 
sample of 15 EU PES, only four did not report having a Datawarehouse and several of these 
did have integrated labour market information systems which appeared similar in form and 
function (Nunn, 2013, pp. 18 & Table 7, p49). Most PES also utilise at least one quality 
management model/standard such as Balanced Scorecards, ISO9000 and the European 
Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) model.  This is significant because each of these 
promote the systematic use of PM and embed it as a governance and management practice.  PM 
is a layered and compounding management technique that is aligned with other formalised 
management processes which then reinforce, legitimate and normalise PM practice. 
 
PM is therefore not only being more widely (universally) taken up, its significance and 
sophistication is growing.  Through these technologies it is being used to lock-in competition 
within sub-state institutions like PES.  For example, PES increasingly utilise Datawarehouses 
to develop comparative ‘benchmarking’ practices between sub-national units (e.g. regions, 
municipalities and offices) to encourage competition over key indicators.  The sophistication 
of this comparison and competition varies but occasionally includes complex clustering to 
compare performance on like terms.  For instance, in Switzerland a summary indicator is 
derived from a weighted index of four indicators and interpreted via an econometric model that 
seeks to account for exogenous variables such as labour market conditions, seasonality, 
demographics and travel-to-work-area dynamics (Nunn, 2013 Box 3 and 4).  In Germany, 
regions are placed into clusters for comparison of performance based on their labour market 
context.  Benchmarking and sharing information between high and low performers is 
encouraged by the Commission and was a major theme of the Peer Review. Subsequent to the 
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Peer Review, the resulting ‘toolkit’ for PES (Scharle, 2013) promotes sub-national 
benchmarking as a mechanism to improve performance.  In addition, competition is in some 
PES driven down to the individual advisor level (e.g. Holland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Austria and 
Germany) and is also occasionally also associated financial incentives for individuals (e.g. 
Austria and Germany).  The Commission is now utilising the same meta-governance process 
to further emphasise both Benchmarking and ‘Benchlearning’ which is intended to add 
knowledge transfer about ‘what works’ in activation in specific economic and institutional 
contexts to the competitive element of Benchmarking.  
The political economy content of depoliticised practice 
To fully understand the political economy significance of these practices it is necessary not just 
to focus on the spread of these practices, but their content (Bredgaard & Larsen, 2007).  
Following this line of argument, PES PM can reveal the real rather than rhetorical emphasis at 
the crux of policy delivery. There are multiple stakeholder audiences for labour market policy, 
each with different interests. Tax payers want labour market policy to reduce welfare spending.  
Business wants labour market policy to produce a ready supply of sufficiently skilled and 
disciplined workers.  Trade unions and workers worry that labour market policy undermines 
living standards and wage bargaining power.  Politicians seeking to attract votes will try to 
combine these different interests in rhetoric about labour market policy in terms of efficiency, 
social justice and economic effectiveness; as in the case of the tension between innovation and 
cost competitiveness in EU strategies.  While some form of balance between these competing 
objectives is possible, they can’t always all be served equally.   In this context, a focus on 
performance management in particular is instructive because it reveals how rhetorical policy 
commitments are translated into frontline goals at the point of implementation. 
 
Table1: Typology of Performance Targets and Indicators for EU PES 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
 
There are a wide range of ways that the performance of PES services can be measured from 
activity/output based approaches, to final outcome indicators (see Table 1).  Activity based 
measures might focus on the behaviours and actions of PES staff; output measures focus on the 
actions taken in respect of referral of jobseekers for some form of support, such as training or 
help to build confidence, deal with problems and so on. Each have their relative merits and 
draw backs in terms of management effectiveness. The general ‘how to’ literature on 
performance management would stress the need for outcome orientation.  However, ‘final 
outcomes’ of desirable labour market performance such as the employment and unemployment 
rate, and productivity are largely beyond the exclusive influence of PES (Nunn, 2012a).  
Equally, PM theory rightly suggests that the measurement of activities and outputs alone 
focuses attention overly on processes at the expense of the outcomes of those processes, with 
negative consequences such as generating perverse and unintended behaviours.  In labour 
market governance these tend to be understood as gaming with performance information and 
'creaming' jobseekers for interventions they do not need, while 'parking' those who might have 
a low liklihood of finding work but who nevertheless would benefit from support  (Bouckaert 
& Peters, 2002; Bruttel, 2005; Neely et al., 1997; Struyven & Steurs, 2005).  As such, there has 
been widespread convergence on the use of ‘intermediate outcome’ indicators, principally 
labour market transitions from unemployment, sometimes into employment (specific 
intermediate outcomes), but sometimes simply from unemployment or welfare benefits to more 
unspecified destinations (Nunn, 2013 esp. Table 2; Nunn et al., 2010, pp. 23–33).  Where 
welfare benefits are in place for the unemployed, unspecific outcomes may be problematic in 
that they might encourage PES staff to pressure jobseekers to leave benefits without having 
employment, pushing them into the informal economy or extreme poverty. 
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The way in which the PES works (with other institutions) to continually reconstruct the 
relationship between demand for, and supply of, labour power is significant in its impact upon 
the complementarity between household and firm decision making, in relation to labour 
supply/demand; pay bargaining; skills and technology development.  In abstract terms, if the 
PES seeks to encourage all jobseekers to find all and any work immediately, the result might 
be rather different to that if the PES placed careful emphasis on matching labour supply with 
particular levels of skill demand or encouraging both employers and jobseekers to increase the 
skills content of labour demand/supply.  It is reasonable to suppose that for any individual 
jobseeker, immediately available jobs will tend to be of a lower skill content and less matched 
to their specific skills than those carefully looked for.  If the PES simply pushes all jobseekers 
toward the first jobs available then skills will likely to be underutilised, higher skill vacancies 
will more likely remain unfilled and less skilled labour will be crowded out of the market, 
resulting in higher levels of unemployment/underemployment and lower productivity.  
Moreover, in as much as both households and employers are likely to respond to these changes 
there may be a dampening affect on skill development and utilisation. By contrast, if PES were 
to look to ways of upskilling the labour power available to employers there may be incentive 
effects to increase the skills content of demand.  Put simply, PES practices influence the content 
of institutional complementarity.  In terms of EU meta-governance this is relevant because 
skills matching has become a noted problem across EU labour markets (European Commission, 
2013). 
 
As Table 2 shows, all those PES in the EU (for whom information is available) have headline 
indicators/targets which focus on transitions away from unemployment. For countries such as 
Denmark and Italy where more localised systems of targets and indicators are in place, 
transitions from unemployment are equally important and prominent among local practices.  
Reinforcing this point, since the crisis there has been a notable shift toward benefit duration 
indicators in PES PM (Nunn, 2012a, p. 19, 2013, p. 16) which encourage PES advisers to work 
more intensively with those they think they can help to move into work so as to reduce the 
duration of unemployment for specific groups of jobseekers, or overall.  In the UK this takes 
the form of an off-flow rate measure which allocates minimum thresholds of the proportion of 
those that flow on to a particular type of benefit who should be expected to flow off (e.g. a 
target) by particular milestones (e.g. 13 weeks, 26 weeks, 52 weeks etc).  Several other PES 
(e.g. Austria, Belgium/Flanders, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Switzerland) have 
indicators and/or targets which measure the proportion of Jobseekers who leave benefits within 
specific timescales (typically 3, 6 or 12 months).  In Germany a ‘pure’ duration measure focuses 
on average benefit durations and includes a placement into work indicator as a proportion of 
the overall unemployed, to give it a dynamic operation (Nunn, 2012a, p. 20).   
Table 2: PES Performance Measures across the EU 
INSERT TABLE 2 about here. 
Adapted from (Nunn, 2012a, 2013) 
 
The increasing use of duration measures may reflect a solidaristic concern with unemployment 
‘scarring’ in the context of the ongoing crisis, but also adds emphasis to a less benign 
interpretation centred on convergence of PES objectives around activation generally and rapid 
activation in particular. ‘Duration measures’ are though also associated with technical 
problems, particularly ‘creaming and parking’ (Grubb, 2004; Nunn, 2012a, p. 11; OSB 
Consulting & Synthesis Forschung, 2007; Synthesis Forschung & OSB Consulting, 2004).2  A 
recent study of the operation of the off-flow rate measure in the UK found direct evidence that 
this may be leading to a prioritisation of Adviser case-loads that is consistent with this effect 
                                                     
2 For a review of creaming and parking and other problems in the operation of PES PM, see 
(Nunn, 2012a, p. 8).  For a review of the various advantages and disadvantages of different types of 
measure see (Nunn, 2012a, p. 13, Table 2).   
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(Nunn et al., 2012, p. 33).  As above, rapid activation may also create negative institutional 
complementarities and mitigate against productivity growth because it may contribute to skills 
matching problems and lower the skills utilisation equilibrium. 
 
Ofcourse it is possible to create baskets of targets and indicators designed to balance out 
incentives such that PES are encouraged to promote transitions to work but also to avoid poor 
quality outcomes.  In contrast to activation, however, many fewer countries include such 
counter-weight measures. Research for a Peer Review and Analytical study found that only 
Austria had a measure of substantive job quality and even this was relatively insubstantial – a 
minimum job outcome of two months to qualify as a transition.  Interestingly, national 
respondents suggested that this qualification resulted from social dialogue and pressure from 
trade unions.  Put another way the balance of social struggle between different interests is not 
only shaped by institutions but is involved dialectically in shaping those institutions themselves 
(Nunn, 2012a, p. 30). Further, in light of the emphasis on facilitating job retention and job-to-
job transitions in PES 2020, there are very few PES where this is built-in to the PM system.  
Only Germany and Switzerland have a prevention of unemployment measure, made possible 
by the unusual legal requirement for employers to notify the PES of impending redundancies.  
Without such a requirement other European PES would be unable to implement such a measure.   
 
Even where such measures are in place, interviews with PES officials and observation of peer-
to-peer meetings suggests that they are given very much less weight and prominence.  A good 
example of this is the UK, where one of the large number of indicators used to measure office, 
team and individual performance is a labour market ‘churn’ indicator, which might be thought 
to counteract the prominence given to immediately moving jobseekers out of unemployment. 
However, in detailed investigation it was clear that very few PES staff were even aware of the 
‘churn’ indicator and it certainly wasn’t used on a day to day basis by managers or frontline 
staff to guide their behaviour (Nunn et al., 2012, p. 31).  Indeed, conversations with frontline 
managers and Advisers over a long period of time in the UK confirm the cultural and deeply 
embedded nature of the emphasis on transitions from benefits, which has been strongly driven 
by performance indicators and targets, aligned with this (Johnson & Nunn, 2005, 2006, 2007; 
Nunn et al., 2012; Nunn & Kelsey, 2007).  What this suggests is that activation and speed 
oriented measures may not only create external institutional complementarities but internal path 
dependent organisational cultures within PES.  Such cultures are difficult to shift to a more 
complex and sophisticated innovation competitiveness orientation, even where policy rhetoric 
suggests this is important. This suggests that detailed management practices and cultures lock-
in particular political economy content as much as institutional design or more prominent quasi-
constitutional measures (e.g. Gill, 1998). 
 
Taking this line of argument further, moving away from cost competition toward strategies for 
innovation competitiveness would entail focussing more on skills based interventions as 
opposed to pure discipline and monitoring.  Many, though fewer than is the case for transitions, 
PES have measures of skill based activities.  113 of the 26 PES for whom we have information 
do measure activities such as referral for external training/interventions.  However, such 
external training can be of highly variable quantity and quality and this is usually measured as 
an activity (e.g. no of jobseekers referred to training) rather than an outcome (i.e. no of 
jobseekers whose skills/qualifications levels have increased or a proportion of the workforce 
with different levels of skills).  Indeed, only Denmark and Bulgaria place an emphasis on the 
measurement of PES activities in relation to overall skill levels as an outcome (Nunn, 2013, p. 
15).  
 
What this suggests is that ‘disempowerment’ in wider social relations, reduces beneficial 
constraints.  In this sense, disempowerment at one point and in one set of instutional relations, 
                                                     
3 Danish municipalities are also likely to measure these activities. 
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makes further disempowerment more likely.  That Austria and Germany retain some scope for 
trade unions to influence policy implementation, at least helps to prevent further 
disempowerment.  The lesson might be that radical change to incorporate labour (and outsider 
groups) in the decision making qand implementation process might help to reintroduce or 
strengthen beneficial constraints; suggesting that performance management might be populated 
with a different political economy content, but only through a more inclusive form of 
governance associated with policy implementation and public management. 
 
If ‘what’s measured is what gets done’ then the focus in PM on immediate employment and a 
lack of emphasis on contributions to up-skilling or job retention/quality suggests that the former 
is relatively well locked-in to practice, compared with the latter.  The overall balance of 
outcomes is likely to promote cost rather than innovation competitiveness, making market 
discipline oriented reform easier than reform to contain discipline and increase skills supply 
and effective utilisation for productivity growth. 
 
Conclusion: PES, disempowered empowerment and political economy 
Activation oriented labour market policy is often regarded as part of a process of 
neoliberalisation, and characterised in part by the disempowerment of labour.  However, recent 
interest in rising inequality and slow growth in advanced economies suggests the need to 
rebalance this disempowerment and to place a greater emphasis on empowering labour through 
skills to generate increased innovation competitiveness as opposed to merely cost 
competitiveness.  This is partly the message carried in the emphasis on ‘inclusive growth’ in 
Europe 2020 and in the associated PES strategy PES 2020. 
 
However, we would argue that neoliberalisation has been present not just in big picture 
strategies and labour market deregulation and welfare conditionality, but also in the detailed 
public management technologies by which ALMPs are implemented.  Performance 
Management in PES is just one example of this, but is illustrative of the ways that 
neoliberalisation is locked in to apparently depoliticised technologies used by public 
management professionals.  This has not just infused public management with neoliberalising 
tendencies, encouraged through multi-scalar policy transfer networks, but also has the perhaps 
unintended consequence of locking-in a particular reform trajectory, even when elite policy 
interests shift.  So the initiatives intended to reduce disempowerment expressed in Europe 2020 
and PES 2020 are difficult to implement precisely because of deeply embedded management 
techniques and practices.  Our evidence suggests tendencies remain broadly unchanged at the 
point of delivery for activation through PES management.  If anything, an even more widely 
shared emphasis on speeding up transitions, driven by the transfer of best practice performance 
indicators, is moving the balance even further toward disempowerment. 
 
However, the data reported above also suggests possible avenues for policy reform, which 
might help to address this trend.  Several EC papers on performance management suggest 
developing an ‘inclusive governance’ approach, building in representation from trade unions, 
employers and advocacy groups (e.g. poverty or disability campaigners) to the target setting 
and monitoring process. This might help to mitigate disempowerment and ‘repoliticise’ public 
management techniques and practices; subjecting them to scrutiny from a range of different 
politicial perspectives on labour market social relations.  Our data suggests that this might help 
to re-balance labour market policy in favour of empowerment.  The small number of cases 
where organised labour retains a powerful role in the governance of labour market policy 
implementation through PES are those where checks on disempowerment are more visibly 
present in the performance management system.  Repoliticising performance management may 
provide scope to promote a different form of policital economy.  This would still be 
contingently contained by the wider social relations of the labour market, so is no panacea, but 
it might offer some route toward greater empowerment, and introduce or strengthen constraints 
which might be beneficial. Quite what this will mean in a period dominated by populism, 
Trump and Brexit remains to be seen (see Morgan, 2017b; Fullbrook and Morgan, 2017).  
11 
 
 
References 
Bassanini, A., & Manfredi, T. (2012). Capital’s Grabbing Hand? A Cross-Country/Cross-
Industry Analysis of the Decline of the Labour Share. Paris: OECD 
Berry, C. and Hay, C. (2016) ‘The Great British ‘Rebalancing’ Act: The construction and 
implementation of an economic imperative for exceptional times,’ British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations 18(1): 3-25 
Boas, T., & Gans-Morse, J. (2009). Neoliberalism: From New Liberal Philosophy to Anti-
Liberal Slogan. Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID), 44(2), 
137–161. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-009-9040-5 
Borghi, V., & Van Berkel, R. (2007) ‘New modes of governance in Italy and the Netherlands: 
the case of activation policies,’ Public Administration, 85(1): 83–101. 
Bouckaert, G., & Peters, G. (2002) ‘Performance Measurement and Management: The 
Achilles’ Heel in Administrative Modernization,’ Public Performance & Management 
Review, 25(4), 359–362.  
Boyer, R. (2015) ‘A world of contrasted but interdependent inequality regimes,’ Review of 
Political Economy 27(4): 481-517 
Bredgaard, T., & Larsen, F. (2007). Implementing public employment policy: what happens 
when non-public agencies take over? International Journal of Sociology and Social 
Policy, 27(7/8), 287–242. 
Brenner, N., Peck, J. and Theodore, N. 2010. ‘After Neoliberalization,’ Globalizations 7(3): 
327-345  
Brenner, N., Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2010). Variegated neoliberalization: geographies, 
modalities, pathways. Global Networks, 10(2), 182–222. 
Bruff, I. (2010) ‘Germany’s Agenda 2010 reforms: Passive revolution at the crossroads,’ 
Capital & Class, 34(3): 409–428   
Burnham, P. (2001). New Labour and the politics of depoliticisation. The British Journal of 
Politics & International Relations, 3(2), 127–149. 
Cammack, P. (2008) ‘Building BRICs for Global Competitiveness: the OECD and the 
Emerging Market Economies,’ Papers in the Politics of Global Competitiveness.  
Cammack, P. (2012) ‘Risk, social protection and the world market,’ Journal of Contemporary 
Asia, 42(3): 359–377 
Caporaso, J. Kim, M. H. Durrett, W. and Wesley, R. (2015) ‘Still a regulatory state? The 
European Union and the financial crisis,’ Journal of European Public Policy 22(7): 
889-907 
Card, D., Kluve, J., & Weber, A. (2010). Active Labour Market Policy Evaluations: A Meta-
Analysis Active Labour Market Policy Evaluations: A Meta-Analysis LABOUR 
MARKET POLICY EVALUATIONS. Economic Journal, 120(548), F452–F477. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02387.x 
Cerny, P. (1997). Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political Globalization. 
Government and Opposition, 32(2), 251–274. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-
7053.1997.tb00161.x 
Cerny, P. (2010). The competition state today: from raison d’Etat to raison du Monde. Policy 
Studies, 31(1), 5–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442870903052801 
Christensen, J. Shaxson, N. and Wigan, D. (2016) ‘The finance curse: Britain and the World 
Economy,’ British Journal of Politics and International Relations 18(1): 255-269 
Cohen, A. and Harcourt, G. (2003) ‘Whatever happened to the Cambridge Capital 
Controversies?’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 17(1): 199-214  
12 
 
Davidson, P. (2015) ‘What was the primary factor encouraging mainstream economists to 
marginalize post Keynesian theory?’ Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics 37(3): 
369-383  
Dunleavy, P. and H., C. (1994) ‘From Old Public Administration to New Public Management,’ 
Public Money and Management 14(3): 9-16 
Ecorys. (2012) PES performance measurement systems and geographical labour mobility: 
Final Report 
Elias, J. (2013). Davos Woman to the Rescue of Global Capitalism: Postfeminist Politics and 
Competitiveness Promotion at the World Economic Forum. International Political 
Sociology, 7(2), 152–169. https://doi.org/10.1111/ips.12015 
Escudero, V. (2015) Are Active Labour Market Policies Effective in Activating and Integrating 
Low-Skilled Individuals? An International Comparison Geneva: ILO 
European Commission (1993) ‘Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment: The challenges 
and ways forward into the 21st century,’ COM(93) 700 final.  
European Commission. (2010a) ‘Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The 
Committee of the Regions: An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European 
contribution towards full employment,’ COM(2010) 682 final.  
European Commission. (2010b) ‘Communication from the Commission: EUROPE 2020 - A 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth,’ COM(2010) 2020 Final.  
European Commission. (2012) ‘Public Employment Services’ Contribution to EU 2020: PES 
2020 Strategy Output Paper. 
European Council. (2000) ‘Presidency Conclusions Lisbon European Council, Lisbon, 23 and 
24 March’. 
European Council. (2009) European Council 10/11 December 2009 Conclusions.  
Filges, T., Smedslund, G., Knudsen, A.-S. D., Jørgensen, A.-M. K., Filges, T., Smedslund, G., 
… Jørgensen, A.-M. K. (2015). Active Labor Market Programme Participation for 
Unemployment Insurance Recipients: A Systematic Review. Campbell Systematic 
Reviews, 11(2). Retrieved from http://campbellcollaboration.org/lib/project/185/ 
Fullbrook, E. and Morgan, J. editors. (2014). Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
London: WEA/College Books   
Fullbrook, E. and morgan, J. editors. (2017). Trumponomics: Causes and Consequences 
London: WEA/College Books  
Gill, S. (1998). European governance and new constitutionalism: economic and monetary union 
and alternatives to disciplinary neoliberalism in Europe. New Political Economy, 3(1), 
5–26. 
Grover, C. (2012) ‘Personalised conditionality: Observations on active proletarianisation in late 
modern Britain,’ Capital & Class 36(2): 283–301 
Grubb, D. (2004) ‘Principles for the performance management of public employment services,’ 
Public Finance & Management 4(3): 352–398 
Grubb D. and Langenbucher, K. OECD (2014) ‘Connecting People With Jobs: Activation 
Policies in the United Kingdom,’ Paris: OECD  
Hay, C. (2013) ‘Treating the symptom not the condition: crisis definition, deficit reduction and 
the search for a new British growth model,’ British Journal of Politics & International 
Relations 15(1): 23-37 
Hay, C. (2007). ‘What Doesn’t Kill You Can Only Make You Stronger: The Doha 
Development Round, the Services Directive and the EU’s Conception of 
Competitiveness,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(1): 25–43  
13 
 
Hay, C., & Rosamond, B. (2002) ‘Globalisation, European integration and the discursive 
construction of economic imperatives,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 9(2): 147-
167  
IMF. (2014). Fiscal Policy and Inequality. IMF Policy Paper. 
Jessop, B. (2006) ‘State- and Regulation-theoretical Perspectives on the European Union and 
the Failure of the Lisbon Agenda,’ Competition & Change, 10(2): 141–161  
Johnson, S., & Nunn, A. (2005) Evaluation of the job outcome target pilots : findings form the 
qualitative study. London: Dept. for Work and Pensions.  
Johnson, S., & Nunn, A. (2006). Evaluation of the Job Outcome Target Pilots: synthesis report. 
Leeds: Corporate Document Services.  
Johnson, S., & Nunn, A. (2007). Working with JOT 18 months on : qualitative research in 
former option 1 pilot districts. Leeds: Corporate Document Services.  
Joseph, J. (2012) The Social in the Global: Social Theory, Governmentality and Global Politics, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Kaltenborn, B., Wielage, N., von Bothmer, A., & Henkel, A. (2011). Zielsteuerung in der 
Arbeitsverwaltung - ein europäischer Vergleich.  
Kennerley, M., & Mason, S. (2008). The Use of Information in Decision Making: Literature 
Review for the Audit Commission UK: Audit Commission.  
Kennerley, M., & Neely, A. (2001) Business Performance Measurement: Theory and Practice. 
In A. Neely (Ed.) Performance Measurement Frameworks: A review. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Kluve, J. (2007). Active Labour Market Policies in Europe: Performance and Prospects. 
Kluve, J. (2010). The effectiveness of European active labor market programs. Labour 
Economics, 17(6), 904–918. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2010.02.004 
Kluve, J., Lehmann, H., & Schmidt, C. M. (2008). Disentangling Treatment Effects of Active 
Labor Market Policies: The Role of Labor Force Status Sequences. Labour Economics, 
15(6), 1270–1295. 
Kok, W. (2004). Facing the challenge: the Lisbon strategy for growth and employment, report 
of the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok. Brussels: European Commission.  
Kumhof, M., & Ranciere, R. (2010). Inequality, leverage and crises. IMF Working Papers, 1–
37. 
Layard, R, Nickell, S, and Jackman, R. (1991) Unemployment: macroeconomic performance 
and the labour market Oxford: Oxford University Press   
Lavoie, M. and Stockhammer, E. editors (2014) Wage-Led Growth: An equitable strategy for 
economic recovery Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan    
Lissenburgh, S. (2004) Data Warehouse Monitoring in the Public Employment Service: 
Austria: Statements and Comments. Mutual Learning Project: Peer Review Paper.  
Mailand, M. (2009) Corporatism in Denmark and Norway - yet another century of 
Scandinavian corporatism? Monatszeitshrift Des Wirtscharfts- Und 
Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts in Der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, 1/2009. 
Martin, J. P., & Grubb, D. (2001). What Works and for Whom: A Review of OECD Countries’ 
experiences with active labour market policies. Working Paper, IFAU-Institute for 
Labour Market Policy Evaluation. 
Meuleman, L. (2008) Public Management and the Meta-governance of Hierarchies, Networks 
and Markets London: Springer 
Morgan, J. (2015) ‘Picketty’s calibration economics: Inequality and the dissolution of 
solutions’ Globalizations 12(5): 803-823  
Morgan, J. (2016) ‘Corporation tax as a problem of MNC organizational circuits: The case for 
unitary taxation,’ British Journal of Politics and International Relations 18(2): 
463-481   
14 
 
Morgan, J. (2017a) ‘Taxing the powerful, the rise of populism and the crisis in Europe: The 
case for the EU Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base,’ International 
Politics DOI 10.1057/s41311-017-0052-x  
Morgan, J. (2017b) ‘Brexit: Be Careful what you wish for?’ Globalizations 14(1): 118-226 
Mosley, H., Schutz, H., & Breyer, N. (2001). Management by Objectives in European Public 
Employment Services Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozialforschung.  
Mosley, H., Schütz, H. and Breyer, N. (2000). Operational Objectives and Performance 
Indicators in European Public Employment Services. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum 
Berlin für Sozialforschung [Research Unit: Labour Market Policy and Employment] 
Nunn, A. (2010). Reframing Corporate Social Responsibility: Lessons from the Global 
Financial Crisis. In W. (et al) Sun (Ed.), Performance management and neo-liberal 
labour market governance: the case of the UK. Emerald. 
Nunn, A. (2012a). Performance Management in Public Employment Services. PES-2-PES 
Mutual Learning Programme. 
Nunn, A. (2012b). The Political Economy of Competitiveness and Social Mobility. British 
Politics 7(2): 86-110 
Nunn, A. (2012c) ‘The Structural Contradictions and Constraints on Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Challenges for Corporate Social Irresponsibility,’ Critical Studies on 
Corporate Responsibility, Governance and Sustainability, 4: 63–82 
Nunn, A. (2013) ‘Review of Performance Management in Public Employment Services Peer 
Review Comparative Paper,’  
Nunn, A. (2015). Saving World Market Society from itself? The New Global Politics of 
Inequality and the agents of global capitalism. Spectrum: Journal of Global Studies, 
7(2). 
Nunn, A. (2016). The production and reproduction of inequality in times of austerity. British 
Politics, 11(4), 469–487. 
Nunn, A., & Beeckmans, P. (2015). The Political Economy of Competitiveness and Continuous 
Adjustment in EU Meta-Governance. International Journal of Public Administration, 
38(12), 926–939.  
Nunn, A., Bickerstaffe, T., Hogarth, T., & Green, A. E. (2010a) Post-Code Selection? 
Employers’ Use of Address-Based Information Shortcuts in Recruitment Decisions, 
DWP Research Report. 
Nunn, A., Bickerstaffe, T., & Mitchell, B. (2010b) International Review of Performance 
Management Systems in Public Employment Services  
Nunn, A., Devins, D., Bickerstaffe, T., & Wymer, P. (2012) Evaluation of the Performance 
Management Framework for Jobcentre Plus 
Nunn, A., & Jassi, S. (2010) Jobcentre Plus Jobseeker’s Allowance off-flow rates: Key 
Management Indicator Post-Implementation Review  
Nunn, A., Johnson, S., Kelsey, S., & Usher, D. (2007) Job Outcome Target National 
Evaluation. DWP Research Report 462  
Nunn, A., & Kelsey, S. (2007) Review of the Adviser Acheivement Tool. DWP Research 
Report 453  
OECD. (1994a) ‘OECD Jobs Study,’ Paris: OECD. 
OECD. (1994b) Performance Management in government: performance measurement and 
results orientated management Paris: OECD. 
OECD. (2011) OECD Ministerial Meeting on Social Policy: Background Document.  
OECD. (2015). In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Retrieved from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/in-it-together-why-less-
inequality-benefits-all_9789264235120-en 
15 
 
Onaran, O. and Boesch, V. (2012) ‘The effect of globalization on the distribution of taxes and 
social expenditures in Europe: Do welfare state regimes matter?’  Environment and 
Planning 46(2): 373-397  
OSB Consulting, & Synthesis Forschung. (2007). PES-Performance, Benchmarking and Good 
Practice: Overview. Vienna: OSB Consulting. Retrieved from 
http://www.ams.at/_docs/Overview_Final.pdf 
Peck, J., Theodore, N., & Brenner, N. (2012). Neoliberalism resurgent? Market rule after the 
Great Recession. South Atlantic Quarterly, 111(2), 265–288. 
Peck, J., & Tickell, A. (2007). Conceptualizing neoliberalism, thinking Thatcherism. 
Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers, 26, 50. 
Peck, J. (2013). ‘Explaining (with) neoliberalism,’ Territory, Politics, Governance 1(2): 132-
157 
Peck, J. (2002) ‘Political Economies of Scale: Fast Policy, Interscalar Relations, and Neoliberal 
Workfare,’ Economic Geography 78(3): 331–360. 
Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2001) ‘Exporting workfare/importing welfare-to-work: exploring the 
politics of Third Way policy transfer,’ Political Geography 20(4): 427–460. 
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. London: Belknap Press. 
Rothschild, K. (2009) ‘Neoliberalism, EU and the evaluation of policies,’ Review of Political 
Economy 21(2): 213-225  
Scharle, A. (2013). Performance Management in Public Employment Services: Toolkit for 
Public Employment Services.  
Streeck, W. (2004). Educating capitalists: a rejoinder to Wright and Tsakalotos. Socio-
Economic Review, (2). 425-438. 
Streeck, W. (2011) ‘The crisis of democratic capitalism,’ New Left Review 71: 5-29 
Streeck, W. (2014) ‘How will capitalism end?’ New Left Review 87: 35-64 
Synthesis Forschung, & OSB Consulting. (2007). Rporting the Benchmarking Results to the 
Head of PES: A tentative proposal in the Austrian Context. PES Benchmarking Project 
Report, WP(02). 
Tergeist, P., & Grubb, D. (2006). ACTIVATION STRATEGIES AND THE PERFORMANCE 
OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES IN GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS AND THE 
UNITED KINGDOM. OECD Papers, 6(13), 1–61. 
Thompson, H. (2013) ‘UK debt in comparative perspective: The pernicious legacy of financial 
sector debt’, British Journal of Politics & International Relations 15(3): 476-492  
Theodore, N., & Peck, J. (2001). Searching for best practice in welfare-to-work: the means, the 
method and the message. Policy & Politics, 29(1), 81–94. 
Van Berkel, R., & van der Aa, P. (2005) ‘The marketization of activation services: a modern 
panacea? Some lessons from the Dutch experience,’ Journal of European Social 
Policy, 15(4): 329–343 
Van Berkel, R. (2010). The provision of income protection and activation services for the 
unemployed in ‘active’welfare states. An international comparison. Journal of Social 
Policy, 39(01), 17–34. 
Van Berkel, R., & Borghi, V. (2008). Review article: the governance of activation. Social 
Policy and Society, 7(03), 393–402. 
Van Berkel, R., & Van der Aa, P. (2012) ‘Activation work: Policy programme administration 
or professional service provision?’ Journal of Social Policy 41(03), 493–510. 
Weishaupt, T., Nunn, A., & Jorgensen, T. (2014) ‘Labor Activation in a Time of High 
Unemployment: Encouraging Work While Preserving the Social Safety-Net,’ in D. 
Besharov & D. Call (Eds.) Delivering Activation: The Perpetual Reform of Public 
Employment Services in Europe 
16 
 
Weishaupt, T. (2010). A Silent Revolution?  Management Ideas and the Reinvention of 
European Public Employment Services. Socio-Economic Review, 8(3), 461–486. 
Weishaupt, T. (2011). Social Partners and the Governance of Public Employment Services: 
Trends and Experiences from Western Europe. International Labour Office Working 
Document, 17(May). 
Whitfield, D. (2001) Public Services or Corporate Welfare: Re-thinking the nation state in the 
global economy, Cambridge: Pluto 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
TABLE 1 
 
18 
 
TABLE 2 
 Process Quality Inputs Outputs  Intermediate Outcomes Analytical 
Measures 
Incentives Indicator/ 
Target 
Setting 
 
 
Jo
bs
ee
ke
r S
at
isf
ac
tio
n  
Em
pl
oy
er
 S
at
isf
ac
tio
n  
Be
ne
fit
 P
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
Ti
m
es
 
Sp
en
di
ng
 
St
af
f n
os
 
V
ac
an
cy
 R
eg
ist
ra
tio
n 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s c
om
pl
et
ed
 
In
d.
 P
la
n 
Co
m
pl
et
io
n 
Re
fe
rra
l t
o 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
Su
pp
or
t/T
ra
in
in
g 
Sa
nc
tio
ns
 
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
O
ff -
flo
w
s  
G
en
er
al
 O
ff -
flo
w
s 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t Q
ua
lit
y/
D
ur
at
io
n  
U
ne
m
p 
/ B
en
ef
it 
D
ur
at
io
ns
 
Pr
ev
en
to
n 
of
 U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
V
ac
an
cy
 O
ut
co
m
es
 
Co
st/
In
pu
t R
at
io
s 
Be
ne
fit
 S
av
in
g 
Ra
te
s 
Re
w
ar
ds
 
Sa
nc
tio
ns
 
A
nn
ua
l 
M
ul
ti -
A
nn
ua
l 
N
ot
es
/ S
ou
rc
es
 
Austria  • • • • 
(% on 
women
) 
 •   •  •  • •  • •  •  •  Peer Review 
2013 
Belgium 
Actris 
• •    •  •   •     •      • Ecorys, 2012 
Belgium 
LeForem 
• •  • •    •  •           • Ecorys, 
2012. 
Belgiam 
VDAB 
• •    •   •  •   •  •      • Peer Review 
2013 
Bulgaria • •  •  •   •  •     •     •  Peer Review 
2013 
Cyprus •* •*    •   •  •   •  •     ? ? * From 2012 
onwards. 
Ecorys, 
2012. 
Czech 
Republic 
        •  •      •       
Denmark                       Municipaliti
es and 
regions are 
left to set 
their own 
targets and 
indicators 
Peer Review 
2013 
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Estonia •  •    •  •  •     •      • Peer Review 
2013 
Finland • •       •  •   •  •   •  ? ? Ecorys, 
2012. 
France • •     •    •  • •  •     ? ? Ecorys, 
2012. 
Germany • • •   •   •  •  • • • •   •  •  Peer Review 
2013 
Greece      •  • •  •   •       ? ? Ecorys, 
2012. 
Hungary • •    •   •  •   •  •       There are 
more than 
200 
indicators 
Peer Review 
2013 
Ireland • •  •   •  •  • •  •   •  ? ? ? ? Ecorys, 
2012. 
Italy                       Highly 
differentiate
d at local 
level so 
difficult to 
summarise 
for national 
picture. 
Ecorys, 
2012. 
20 
 
 Process Quality Inputs Outputs  Intermediate Outcomes Analytical 
Measures 
Incentives Indicator/ 
Target 
Setting 
 
 
Jo
bs
ee
ke
r S
at
isf
ac
tio
n  
Em
pl
oy
er
 S
at
isf
ac
tio
n 
Be
ne
fit
 P
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
Ti
m
es
 
Sp
en
di
ng
 
St
af
f n
os
 
V
ac
an
cy
 R
eg
ist
ra
tio
n 
In
te
rv
ie
w
s c
om
pl
et
ed
 
In
d.
 P
la
n 
Co
m
pl
et
io
n 
Re
fe
rra
l t
o 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
Su
pp
or
t/T
ra
in
in
g 
Sa
nc
tio
ns
 
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
O
ff-
flo
w
s 
G
en
er
al
 O
ff -
flo
w
s  
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t Q
ua
lit
y/
D
ur
at
io
n  
U
ne
m
p 
/ B
en
ef
it 
D
ur
at
io
ns
 
Pr
ev
en
to
n 
of
 U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
V
ac
an
cy
 O
ut
co
m
es
 
Co
st/
In
pu
t R
at
io
s  
Be
ne
fit
 S
av
in
g 
Ra
te
s 
Re
w
ar
ds
 
Sa
nc
tio
ns
 
A
nn
ua
l 
M
ul
ti-
A
nn
ua
l  
N
ot
es
/ S
ou
rc
es
 
Latvia •                      Nunn et al., 
2010. 
Lithuania      •   •   • •   •       Peer Review 
Luxembour
g 
        •              Data on LU 
is very 
sparse.  
Ecorys, 
2012. 
Malta                       No 
information 
Netherlands • •    •   •  •   •     • • •  Peer 
Review, 
2013 
Poland         •  •        ? ?   Peer Review 
2013 
Portugal      •  • •   •           Nunn et al. 
2010. 
Romania                       No 
information 
Slovakia                       No 
information 
Slovenia • •       •  •          •  Peer 
Review, 
2013 
Spain •      •  •  •  •    •    •  Locally set 
targets and 
indicators, 
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Peer Review 
2013 
Sweden • •  •    • •  •   •  •     •  Peer Review 
2013 
United 
Kingdom 
•  •   •    • •   •       •  Peer Review 
2013 
 
 
 
 
 
